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THE CONSENT DECREE
IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
By CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR.*
During the past ten years, the United States has witnessed what
might be called a "revival" of antitrust enforcement. In 1959, for
example, the Government filed sixty-three antitrust cases; more than
at any time since 1943 when Thurman Arnold brought seventy sepa-
rate suits. Included were ten anti-merger suits filed under the Clayton
Act, a ioo per cent increase over 1958 and half again as many as in any
year since the statute was adopted in 1914.1
These facts and figures are impressive, but the enforcement of our
antitrust laws must involve more than simply the filing of numerous
suits. The maintenance of a competitive economy is not an end in it-
self, but rather a means to an end. That end: efficient resource alloca-
tion throughout the economy, a higher standard of living for all,
and the preservation of personal freedom.
Historically, the disposition of antitrust cases by consent of the
parties, rather than through court trial, has been an outstanding
feature of the administration of the antitrust laws by the Department
of Justice. Nearly three out of every four of the civil antitrust cases
that the Department has started have ended by consent. 2 Recently,
several important cases have been disposed of in this manner, in-
cluding cases involving IBM, AT&T, Eastman Kodak, and United
Fruit.
The development and use of the consent decree as the major instru-
ment in the Antitrust Division's program to enforce the antitrust
laws has generated substantial controversy. This article will discuss
the nature, legal basis, and use of the consent decree, as well as its
results. Some suggestions will also be made as to how the consent de-
cree could be made an even more effective instrument in future anti-
trust enforcement.
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1956,
University of New Hampshire; Ph.D. sg6o, Harvard University.
1Department of Justice Press Release of January 4, ig6o.
2Consent Decree Program of the Department of Justice, Report of the Anti-
trust Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 86th
Gong., January 3o, 1959, p. IX. (Hereinafter referred to as "Report.")
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I. NATURE AND USE OF CONSENT DECREES
A consent decree usually emerges from a series of secret, informal
negotiations between lawyers representing the Antitrust Division and
counsel for the defense. In theory, one of the principal objectives of
the consent decree procedure is to eliminate the time and expense in-
volved in trial preparation. Consequently, a compromise is ordi-
narily reached at a relatively early stage in the litigation. In the ma-
jority of civil antitrust actions, the consent decree is entered shortly
after the filing of the complaint and before the use of discovery pro-
cedures. Similarly, where a criminal action is commenced by the
Division and where the defendant wishes to settle, "if agreement is
reached, a consent decree will be entered in a civil proceeding insti-
tuted for that purpose, and the prosecution terminated by a nolle
pros." 3
In many cases, a number of defendants are involved. Some may
agree to terminate the proceedings by accepting the relief demanded by
the Division, while, at the same time, other defendants may decide to
litigate the legal and factual questions involved. In such circumstances,
the Division negotiates such consent judgments with fewer than all
defendants even though less drastic relief may be awarded against
litigating defendants than against those who entered into a consent
decree.
The burden of initiating negotiations and preparing a first draft of
the provisions of a consent decree rests upon the defendant. As ex-
plained by former Assistant Attorney General Hansen:
"When the defendants wish to settle the case against them
without trial, they are instructed to submit a proposed decree
to the trial staff; their draft uses the prayer of the complaint
as a guide to the Government's desires for relief.
Of course, defendants' counsel may discuss with the trial
staff their views on relief terms before they submit the initial
proposal, but the Division adheres to the practice of defendant-
initiated consent-settlement drafts to avoid any implication of
coercion occasioned by an accompanying criminal action and to
retain flexibility until actual negotiations begin."
4
In 1954 the Antitrust Division revealed an innovation in its con-
sent decree procedure when it announced a settlement accepted by
3Katz, The Consent Decree-Antitrust Administration, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 415,
423 (1940)-
'Consent Decree Program of the Department of Justice, Antitrust Subcom-
mittee, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 85th Cong., serial No.
9, p. ii. (Hereinafter referred to as "Hearings.')
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the Eastman Kodak Company on the day the case was filed with the
court.5 Here, the terms of the settlement were negotiated before
bringing suit and the costs of litigation were saved. In such a situation
the Division first approaches the defendants to notify them in ad-
vance about the contemplated action and to outline in general terms
the grievance. "If the prospective defendants care to start negotiations
toward a possible decree in advance of the filing of our complaint,
we are ready to meet them at the conference table." 6 Since 1954, this
method has been used in settling a growing number of civil suits.
Whichever method is used, after the defendants have submitted a
draft of their proposals, a period of extensive negotiations begins
with the lawyers of the Antitrust Division over the final provisions of
the decree. On occasion outsiders may be consulted by the Division.
Nevertheless, the negotiations are secret, the public is excluded from
the negotiating process, and the information that is exchanged be-
tween the parties is strictly confidential.7 After agreement has been
reached on the terms of the decree, the final arrangements for its
submission for court approval are kept confidential. Only after the
decree has been filed in court does the public become aware of what
has transpired.
Generally, consent decrees are accepted and signed by the court
as a routine matter. If the court, after a brief presentation by defen-
dant's counsel and the Division's lawyers, is satisfied that the parties
are in agreement, the requested order is entered with but a cursory
examination. Findings of fact or conclusions of law are not made, nor
are they required.8 "Current procedure contains no provision to re-
quire the Department of Justice to prepare a written statement that
sets forth the facts on which the Government based its case, what the
terms of the decree are expected to accomplish, or the reasons for the
Government's acceptance of the particular compromise. Similarly, the
court is not requested or required to render a written opinion."9 As
will be discussed below, these procedures for the entry and acceptance
of consent decrees represent a departure from litigated antitrust
actions.
Such, then, is the nature of a consent decree. In 1940 the Tempor-
'United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., CCH 1954 Trade Cas. 67,920.
6Hearings, p.12.
7The Antitrust Division refused to supply the Antitrust Subcommittee with
details concerning consent decree negotiations in the AT&T and oil pipeline
cases. See Hearings, pp. XI-XIV.
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ary National Economic Committee reported that over one-half of the
antitrust civil actions instituted by the Division had resulted in ne-
gotiated settlements.10 Since that time the proportion has been even
higher. In the 5-year period 1950-54, 97 cases, or 65 per cent of the
i5o civil cases terminated were disposed of by consent judgments. In
the 5-year period 1955-59, 121 cases, or 79 per cent of the 154 civil cases
terminated ended by consent.1 As a form of antitrust enforcement,
consent decrees today are fully as important as are court decisions.
II. LEGAL ASPECTS AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN DECREES AND LITIGATED CASES
The Sherman Act does not provide for the settlement of antitrust
suits through consent decrees; nor is there any reference to such a
procedure in the congressional debates. The only reference to consent
decrees is contained in section 5 of the Clayton Act. That section pro-
vides that consent decrees cannot be used as evidence of antitrust
violations in private actions against the defendant. 12 By this provision,
Congress recognized by implication the Attorney General's authority
to use consent decrees in terminating antitrust litigation.
While the legal authority to dispose of litigation by consent of
the parties does not rest upon express statutory provision, there is an
implied power derived from the historical right of the prosecutor
to initiate and conclude legal proceedings. "It emerges out of the very
process of litigation; settlement out of court is one of the oldest of
legal usages."' 3 Its use dates from 19o6, 14 and has largely been un-
questioned since the early case of Swift & Co. v. United States.'5
"Hamilton and Till, TNEC Monograph No. 16, p. 88 (1940).
211nformation supplied by Antitrust Division.
138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1952). Section 5(a), as amended in 1955, reads
as follows:
"(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil
or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima
fade evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any
other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under
section 4A, as to all. matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be
an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply
to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or
to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 4 A."
u3Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note ito, at 88.
"United States v. Otis Elevator Co., i D. & J. ioi (9th Cir. 19o6).
2-The courts have frequently recognized the existence of this implied power. See
Crysler Corp. v. United States, 316 US. 556 (1942); Aluminum Co. of America v.
United States, 302 U.S. 230 (1937); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. io6 (1932);
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In the latter case, it was argued on appeal to the Supreme Court
that a prior consent decree was void for six specific reasons, two of
which were as follows: (i) that jurisdiction under the antitrust laws
cannot be conferred upon the courts by consent, and (2) that the At-
torney General had no power to assent to the decree entered in this
instance.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court,
rejected these contentions and sustained the validity of the earlier
decree. With respect to the decree complained of, the Court held that
there was clearly no lack of judicial power to enter the decree. The
Court further held that decrees could be challenged on the basis of
clerical errors in their composition, fraud in their procurement, the ab-
sence of actual consent to the decree when entered, or the lack of feder-
al jurisdiction because of the citizenship of the parties. Barring these,
however, the Court quoted with approval a previous decision which
stated: "a decree which appears by the record to have been rendered by
consent is always affirmed, without considering the merits of the
cause."16
As a consequence of Swift, as well as subsequent decisions, the
legal basis of consent decrees is now firmly established. Since such
decrees evolve through a process of negotiation rather than litiga-
tion, they have several other important legal features. First, only
two issues are determined in such settlements: that the court in which
the decree is entered has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, and that the complaint upon which the decree is based
states a valid claim upon which relief may be granted. 17 Normally in
a consent decree, the defendants deny the substantive allegations of
the Government's complaint but agree to the entry of the decree
"without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law ... and with-
out any admission by plaintiff or defendant in respect to any is-
sue...."l8
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); United States v. International
Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F.
Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (943). The Attorney General,
in a formal opinion, has upheld the authority to compromise litigation in which the
United States is a party as an inherent power of his office. 38 Ops. Att'y Gen. 98.
1 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261 (1885).
""This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter herein and of all the parties
hereto. The complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against
each of the defendants under Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Act of Congress of July 2,
189o, entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,' commonly known as the Sherman Act, as amended." United States v.
Western Electric Co. CCH 1956 Trade Cas. 68,246.
1I8bid.
x961]
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Second, a consent settlement is unlike a private agreement in that
once it has been accepted by a court, it has the same legal effect as
a judgment in a fully litigated action. As the Supreme Court put it
in the Swift case: "We reject the argument... that a decree entered
upon consent is to be treated as a contract and not as a judicial act."
The effect, the Court continued, "is all one whether the decree has
been entered after litigation or by consent."' 9 As a judicial act, there-
fore, a consent decree constitutes determination by the court that its
content is equitable and in the public interest. The parties are
bound and confined by the terms of the decree insofar as equitable re-
lief is obtainable under the state of facts alleged in the complaint. 20
Third, a consent decree often establishes the standard of conduct
for an entire industry. Companies that are not parties to the decree
may be affected in their competitive relationships by its terms. As de-
scribed in the 194o TNEC investigation:
"The instrument has a sweep which no process of law could
ever impart. It can go beyond sheer prohibition; it can attempt
to shape remedies to the requirements of industrial order. If
the demand is for adjustment within an intricate scheme of
trade practices, at least it supplies the instrument. It can reach
beyond the persons in legal combat to comprehend all the
parties to the industry. It can accord some protection to weaker
groups and safeguard to some extent the rights of the public.
It can, unlike a decree emerging from litigation, take into ac-
count the potential consequences of its terms."
21
Finally, to "effectuate... the basic purposes of the original consent
decree," courts may approve modifications after entry.2 In the Swift
case, the Supreme Court declared: "We are not doubtful of the power
of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed
conditions though it was entered by consent." The Court recognized
that this power existed "by force of principles inherent in the juris-
diction of the chancery."23
Some cases seem to preclude the Government from modifying a
consent decree in the absence of changed industry conditions. Thus in
the International Harvester case, it was held that the United States
may not petition for additional relief that is not contained in the con-
"United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 1O6, 114-15 (1932).
wSee Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311. 331, 332 (1928); United States v.
Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 6 54, 655-56 (D. Del. 1942).
mHamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note io, at 88.
'Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1924).
"United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 1O6, 114 (1932).
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sent decree on the ground that it feels the remedies already provided
are inadequate.24 And in the RCA case, Judge Mars declared:
"Since these consent decrees are based upon agreement made
by the Attorney General which is binding upon the Govern-
ment the defendants are entitled to set them up as a bar to
any attempt by the Government to relitigate the issues raised
in the suit or to seek relief with respect thereto additional to
that given by the consent decree."
25
At the same time, the court held that the Division may not institute
a wholly new proceeding involving a situation already covered by a
consent decree unless based upon additional facts that did not form
the basis of the original proceedings.
2 6
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that there has been a re-
laxation in the test which must be met when the Division attempts to
obtain a modification of a consent decree. 27 It now appears that a
consent decree may be changed so as to afford the additional relief
that is needed to preserve competition. The Antitrust Division thus
analyzed the Hughes case:
"[I]t appears that the Supreme Court recognized, as it would
seem it must, that (in a Sherman Act case at least) a consent
decree could not constitute a license to a defendant to continue
in violation of the law if the Government could show in a
hearing that additional different relief (in this instance divesti-
ture) was absolutely necessary to preserve competition and pre-
vent monopoly."
2s
Defendants also have the right to obtain modifications of con-
sent decrees. In the opinion of the Division, defendants must show
as conditions precedent that: (1) since entry of the decree there has
occurred an unexpected and unforeseen change in the controlling facts
upon which the decree was based; (2) as a result of such change in
circumstances the decree has been turned into an instrument of wrong
and would, if continued to be applied to the defendant, impose an un-
due and unreasonable competitive or financial hardship; and (3) as
a result of such change in circumstances the dangers contemplated
by the decree no longer exist and, therefore, modification would not
be inconsistent with the public interest. 29
2'United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
nUnited States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Del. 1942).
"See Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 3o2 U.S. 230 (1937).
-Liquid, Carbonic Corp. v. United States, 350 U.S. 869 (1954); Hughes
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One further legal aspect deserves consideration: the differences
between consent decrees and litigated cases. Stated broadly, consent
decree procedures almost entirely eliminate independent judicial
determination of the legal and factual issues involved.3 0 This is true
despite the fact, as pointed out above, that the final order is treated
as any other judicial mandate. In contrast, the basic issues are carefully
spelled out in a trial. Challenged industry practices are examined
at length and in public. The trial judge is required to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support his judgment. The court's
final order must carefully outline the practices considered illegal and
disclose the reasons that justify injunctive relief. Moreover, since
direct appeal to the Supreme Court is permitted in antitrust cases
brought by the Government, the litigated case often provides the Court
with the opportunity to establish precedent.
These differences between consent decrees and litigated cases have
caused many observers to feel that the judicial function has been
superseded by an administrative procedure in the enforcement of the
Sherman Act. In large part, such a result is due to economy-anti-
trust cases which are litigated are expensive. The result is also due
to the growing complexity of antitrust enforcement. As a conse-
quence, litigation and negotiation have become alternative means to
the same end.
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
OF THE CONSENT DECREE PROCEDURE
Consent settlements have important advantages to both the
Government and defendants, as well as to the public. Yet, their wide-
spread use in the postwar period has resulted in considerable con-
troversy.
The consent decree procedure has the advantage of brevity. For
the fiscal years 1951 through 1957, the average time lapse from com-
plaint to final disposition for 74 litigated cases was 59.27 months; the
comparable time for 139 consent cases was 32.86 months.3 ' Thus on
the average two more years are required to try a case than to obtain
relief by means of consent settlement. If the Government obtains
the same or similar relief by means of a consent settlement, not only
can time and funds be saved by all concerned, including the public,
but undesirable practices in an industry can be quickly curtailed.
3OHearings, p. 46. See Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through
Consent Decrees, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 408 (194o).
3'Hearings, p. 430.
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Beyond the saving of time and funds, a consent settlement avoids
difficulties of court proof. In litigation involving economic issues,
proof is often onerous. The consent decree in the Swift case has been
analyzed in this way:
"The defendants accepted a provision prohibiting them
from using or permitting others to use their distributive facili-
ties for the handling of 114 food products. In view of the ex-
tensiveness and variety of the distributive facilities in ques-
tion... as well as the number of the products, immense amounts
of data would have been necessary to support either side had the
case been contested... determining what part of the overhead
of these facilities should be allocated to the cost of each product
would lead to interminable argument with little prospect of
reaching satisfactory conclusion. But painstaking demonstra-
tion is not necessary for informal compromise. Through the
consent decree, issues on which proof would be almost impos-
sible in a contested suit may be settled by stipulation." 32
If properly used, consent settlements provide an economical and
prompt procedure for terminating antitrust cases and promoting
competition. "In consent decree negotiations, no formalized pro-
cedures stand between the parties and the economic and legal prob-
lems before them. As a result, the possibility of more practicable solu-
tions is greatly enhanced."3 3 Indeed, it may even be true that decree
terms are more stringent than those which might have been obtained
by litigation.34
Another advantage of consent settlements is that they permit
consultation with other interested parties. In the past, the lack of
consultation has been a major objection to the use of decrees. More
recently, however, the Division had indicated a willingness to confer
with those in industry. As explained by former Assistant Attorney
General Hansen:
"Negotiating the IBM judgment, for example, we met with
others in the industry to secure, first, a full understanding of
industry problems, and industry views on effective relief, and,
second, aid in understanding technical complications of tabu-
lating and electronic data processing machines. Indeed, in one
recent judgment (R. L. Polk & Co., CCH Trade cases, par.
67,993) the court declined entry until the Division could of-
fer assurance we had obtained the views of complainants as to
the effectiveness of proposed judgment provisions. Carrying
this process one step further, in the various Paramount judg-
'1Isenbergh and Rubin, op. cit. supra note 3o, at 390-91.
n3Ibid.
' 4See Comment, 55 Mich. Law Rev. 92, 111 (1956).
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ments specifying divestiture details, the Division publicly an-
nounced judgment provisions well in advance of submission
to court."
35
Under the provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act, any person
who has been injured in his business by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue to recover three times the
damages he has sustained, plus the cost of the suit and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Under section 5 of the same act, a final judgment in
a case brought by the United States may be used in private treble
damage suits as prima facie evidence against the defendant. A con-
sent decree cannot be used for this purpose.
Treble damage suits were relatively unimportant during the first
50 years of antitrust enforcement, when only 13 suits were won by
private parties. The postwar period, however, has witnessed the
emergence of the private litigant as a significant adjunct of antitrust
enforcement. Damages have been assessed both frequently and in sub-
stantial amounts. From 1951 to 1957, there were 220 public and 1,28o
private suits. Although the maximum penalty that may be imposed
upon conviction of an antitrust violation is S5o,ooo for each count in
the indictment, the recovery in some private actions has exceeded
the million dollar figure.3 6
Complete or even partial immunity from private treble damage
suits is a primary incentive in defendants' willingness to negotiate
consent settlements. In major cases, where the issues in fact or law are
uncertain, consent settlements would in all probability be impossible
to negotiate if the defendants did not thereby secure protection from
treble damage suits.
A final advantage is that consent proceedings permit defendants to
avoid some of the unfavorable publicity usually associated with liti-
gated cases. While the filing of a complaint against a company is ac-
companied by the announcement of a settlement, coverage in the press
is often minimal compared with the publicity that surrounds a
lengthy trial.
Against these advantages, however, must be weighed the disad-
vantages. In the first place, while negotiation may save time and
funds thereby allowing the Division to initiate more cases, quality
3Hearings, pp. 431-32.
'Brookside Theater Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 193 F.2d 896 (4 th
Cir. 1952) ($I,125,0oo). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 US. 251 (1946);
($36o,ooo); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 US. 555 (1931) ($195,000); Mil-
waukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 19o F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 909 (1952) ($941,574); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 182 F.2d 228 (7 th
Cir. 195o), reversed, 340 US. 441 (1951) ($975,oo).
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is more important than quantity. The termination of any antitrust ac-
tion should represent a legal and economic victory. Far too often the
dominant objective of antitrust prosecution has been only legal
victory and the consent decree has been merely one way of closing a
case. Enforcement becomes all important.
Secondly, some critics maintain that treble damage actions by
private parties were intended by Congress to constitute an important
auxiliary enforcement measure in antitrust administration. The fact
that consent decrees cannot be used as prima facie evidence in such
cases means that a private action becomes more difficult. "The almost
inevitable consequence of the acceptance of a consent decree by the
Department of Justice in an antitrust action, therefore, is to reduce the
effectiveness of section 5 of the Clayton Act and to deprive private
suitors, who have been injured by unlawful conduct, of their statu-
tory remedies under the antitrust laws." 37 This becomes even more
important, critics maintain, when it is realized that nearly 90 per cent
of all treble damage suits have followed in the wake of victorious
Government actions in fully litigated cases.38
The Division is well aware of this problem. Testifying before
the Antitrust Subcommittee in 1957, Assistant Attorney General Han-
sen stated:
"The Division is aware that private suit serves the double
function of making businessmen the allies of the Government
in enforcing antitrust policy and of giving compensatory re-
lief to injured parties. No set rule may be adopted for balanc-
ing the functions of private suits with the Division's need for
maximum antitrust enforcement. The efficacy of each method
must depend upon the facts of each case." 39
Even more recently, the Antitrust Division announced a further
policy change. Assistant Attorney General Bicks said that unless a
company admits its guilt, the Division intends to refuse to enter into
a consent decree with a company accused of breaking the antitrust laws
in dealing with local and state agencies. Reportedly, the new policy
is designed primarily to help local and state governments recover all
or part of the losses they feel they have sustained because of an anti-
trust violation. Moreover, the new policy might also open up a new
era of private treble damage suits. 40
Finally, critics maintain that once the Division has entered into
'Report, p. 24.
'Report, p. 23 n.73. See Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis
of Developments in the Treble Damage Suits, 61 Yale L.J. loio, io6o (1952).
3Hearings, p. 432.
Wall Street Journal, March 14, i96o, p. 26.
ig6i]
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a consent decree, it turns its attention to other business and neglects
the industry. "As a consequence, failure of the Department to en-
force the provisions of consent decrees rendered them virtually a license
for further antitrust violation."41 Of crucial significance, therefore,
is the enforcement and results of consent decrees.
IV. RESULTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF CONSENT DECREES
Whether the termination of antitrust action is the result of liti-
gation or negotiation, enforcement is critical. Unless practices found
illegal are discontinued, currently and in the future, antitrust action
is devoid of significance. Does the Antitrust Division have an instru-
ment with which to make decrees effective?
Writing in 194o, Hamilton and Till stated:
"If a decree provides for immediate changes, such as the
sale of a property, a divestment of shares of stock, the disso-
lution of a trade association, the file is held open until such
steps are taken. After that is done, the matter is adjudicated,
the issues are removed from controversy. In the records of
Justice the episode is dosed; the case has gone to the hall of
records; a fresh initiative is necessary to call it once more into
action. Nor is an effort made to follow up the decree, observe
success and shortcomings in operation, check practical result
against intent, determine upon necessary revisions."
42
In support of this conclusion is the fact that from the passage of
the Sherman Act through 1952, the Division had instituted only 18
criminal or civil contempt proceedings to enforce judgments entered
in Government antitrust suits. 43 By and large, effective enforcement
was nonexistent.
More recently, some improvement can be noted. From 1953 through
1957, 9 criminal or civil contempt proceedings were brought. The
Judgments and Judgment Enforcement Section of the Division-the
section responsible for the enforcement of all antitrust judgments-
was increased from ii to 21 staff attorneys. Today, the section devotes
at least 90 per cent of its time to enforcement, compared to 50 per
cent a few years ago. In the enforcement of the Atlantic Refining




"Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note io, at 92-93.
"Hearings, p. 434-
"Id. at pp. 435-441. More recently, the Government announced a settlement
terminating a civil contempt action against the A. B. Dick Company. The Company
was charged with violating certain provisions of a consent decree entered on March
25, 1948. Department of Justice Press Release September 13, 196o.
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In the opinion of the present writer, however, enforcement pro-
ceedings are still far from ideal. The Division learns about noncom-
pliance from three sources: industry surveys made by. the Division,
complaints by persons who are adversely affected by acts of a defend-
ant, and from incidental notices in trade journals. As these methods
imply, no systematic enforcement procedure has been developed.
Budgetary limitations explain, in large part, the failure of the
Antitrust Division to establish more adequate procedures. Limited
personnel have little opportunity to devote sufficient attention to the
enforcing of the more than 400 outstanding judgments. This situation,
while explainable, still remains a serious deficiency in the administra-
tion of the antitrust laws.
The enforcement problem, however, must not obscure the bene-
ficial results of consent decrees. Often the results are readily appar-
ent. Two examples will serve to illustrate how consent judgments
can result in new competition.
45
i. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.4 6 The Division's complaint
sought the abolition of Kodak's monopoly of amateur color film pro-
cessing and the company's practice of controlling the resale price of
its color film by fair-trade contracts, including in the retail price an
unsegregated charge for subsequent processing of the film. A consent
decree was negotiated prior to the filing of the complaint.
The decree required Kodak to cancel its fair-trade contracts and
enjoined their use in the future. In addition, the decree prohibits
Kodak from selling its color film with a processing charge in the sale
price, and from tying together in any other way the sale and processing
of its film. The company is required: (a) to grant upon request licenses
on reasonable royalties under its pertinent processing and material
patents; (b) to provide upon request technical manuals describing
its color film processing technology; (c) to send technically qualified
persons to plants of independent processors to supplement the techni-
cal information contained in the manuals; and (d) to permit indepen-
dent processors to send technical personnel to certain of its processing
plants to observe the processing methods, processes, machines, and
equipment.
"Within 4 months of the decree 9 regional or national firms
had announced plans or actually begun to seek business in color
finishing. Eighteen months after the judgment 8 companies had
"The information regarding these two decrees is found in the testimony of
former Assistant Attorney General Hansen. Hearings, pp. 433-34-
"CCH 1956 Trade Gas. 67,920.
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made investments of over $iooooo. Of these one had invest-
ed $65o,ooo and 2 firms had invested more than $i million. In
addition, innumerable small-businessmen were expected to seek
the local finishing business. One company which served about
125 dealers in New York City soon after the decree announced
an expenditure of $7o,ooo to buy equipment from Eastman."
47
2. United States v. International Business Machines.48 The com-
plaint against IBM charged that the company owned more than 90
per cent of all tabulating machines and sold approximately 90 per
cent of all tabulating cards used in the United States. The complaint
further alleged that IBM had excluded other manufacturers and po-
tential manufacturers of tabulating machines and cards from the
industry, had cramped the growth of independent service bureaus, and
had stunted the independent business of repairing tabulating ma-
chines and manufacturing and distributing replacement parts. The
complaint charged IBM with utilizing several means for achieving
these illegal ends, but the heart of the plan was the Company's re-
fusal to sell its machines. Moreover, leases were made only under
tabulating service agreements providing for a single charge cover-
ing rental of the machines, instruction in their use, repairs and main-
tenance. Consequently, lessees had little incentive either to rely upon
independent business for services or to service the machines them-
selves.
Under the terms of the consent decree, IBM was required to sell
as well as lease their machines upon reasonable terms. All members
of the tabulating industry were given access to existing IBM patents
and patent applications at reasonable royalties. In addition, the
Company was forbidden to require any lessee or purchaser of a ma-
chine to have it repaired by or purchase parts from IBM. "Should
this program for relief prove ineffective, a sword of Damocles provi-
sion requires IBM to divest itself after 7 years of any part of its
manufacturing capacity which would then be in excess of 50 per cent of
the total capacity in the United States unless IBM can show sub-
stantial competitive conditions exist or that divestiture is not ap-
propriate."
"Within less than 6 months of the judgment several com-
panies had indicated that they planned to enter the business
of (i) manufacturing and selling tabulating machines, (2) re-
pairing and maintaining those machines, (3) manufacturing
' Hearings, p. 433-
"CCH 1956 Trade Cas. 68,245.
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tabulating cards, and (4) preparing, via service bureaus, ac-
counting and statistical information on a fee basis." 49
These two consent decrees have achieved positive results. They are
also enforceable. Whatever the pros or cons of the decrees' terms may
be, they clearly demonstrate the impact and competitive results that
the Antitrust Division's program is capable of achieving.
V. SUmzMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE USE OF CONSENT DECREES
The consent decree has become one of the Antitrust Division's most
important instruments for terminating antitrust cases. Its legal status
is well established. Nor is it mere speculation to suggest that the use
of the consent decree will continue to be important in the future.
And yet, an essential question remains: have the results of consent
decree settlements indicated mere legal victories devoid of com-
petitive significance?
This question was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the Inter-
national Salt case of 1947. Delivering the majority opinion, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
"In an equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment
of past transgression, nor is it merely to end specific illegal
practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they
effectively pry open to competition a market that has been
closed by defendant's illegal restraints. If this decree accom-
plished less than that, the government has won a law suit and
lost a cause."50
In general, the effectiveness of consent decrees has varied widely
from case to case. Some consent decrees have produced readily ap-
parent results, such as the two outlined in the preceding section. Far
more often, however, they have been either filed and forgotten or they
have been the subject of dispute over the meaning of the decrees'
terms. In the latter situations, enforcement has been neglected. As
a means of settling antitrust cases the use of the consent decree should
not be curtailed. At the same time, three procedural changes might
result in their improvement.
I. Under present practices, the terms of a consent decree are kept
secret until after the decree has been finally entered. Often, interested
third parties have not been consulted. It has been proposed that a
consent decree should be published and that a waiting period should
"Hearings, p. 434.
5DInternational Salt Co. Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
x961]
54 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
be afforded to interested parties to present their views to the court
before the decree is finally presented to the court.51 Such a change
would permit third parties, who will be in some way affected by the
entry of a decree, an opportunity to present their objections to the
court without becoming litigants in the proceeding. Third parties
thus will be provided with a limited measure of protection.
2. At present, especially under the prefiling negotiation procedures,
the complaint and the decree are entered simultaneously. The decree
is usually approved by the court and a public announcement made of
the fact. It is recommended that along with the complaint and the
decree, the Antitrust Division should file a brief that would cover
the following: the facts upon which the Government based its case,
the meaning of the terms of the decree, what the decree is expected
to accomplish, and the reasons for the Government's acceptance of
the particular compromise. Such a statement would have two
advantages: (a) it would indicate to all interested parties the basis
of the case and the settlement objectives, and (b) it would be of aid
in the enforcement of the consent decree.
3- Of even more critical importance, however, is enforcement.
Antitrust decrees have never been systematically enforced. The Anti-
trust Division has lacked the money and the staff to carry out this
function and to check on the observance of decree terms. Once the
court has accepted the decree, the case has been closed, except in the
rare instances where dissolution or divestiture has been required.
Often the provisions of a decree have become obsolete, but they have
not been modified unless the defendants have come into court and
asked that they be liberalized. The success of an antitrust program
depends upon adequate enforcement.
Effective enforcement would mean, of course, an added cost. With
more than 400 decrees now outstanding, systematic investigations by
the Division would require a larger staff than at present, and so a
larger appropriation. But only in this way can decrees be kept up-to-
date and achieve their purposes.52
These three procedural changes might well result in fewer defend-
ants accepting consent decrees when faced with antitrust action. In-
',See H.R. Rep. No. 2465, 8oth Cong., 2d sess. 27 (1948).
52One writer has recommended that the duration of consent decrees be limited
to a certain number of years on the theory that any decree which does not restore
competition within that period requires modification or additional action on the
part of the Government. See Kramer, Modifications of Consent Decrees, 56 Mich. L.
Rev. 105 i (1957)- If decrees were adequately enforced, however, no such arbitrary
time limit would need to be imposed.
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stead, defendants might decide to proceed to trial and thus risk
receiving an adverse court decision and becoming subject to treble
damage suits. 5 3 In any event, the end result would be beneficial,
for quality is of more importance than mere quantity. The success
of antitrust action can never be measured by the number of cases
started or terminated. Success can only be measured by the effect upon
competition and the economy of the resulting decisions and decrees.
Despite defects, however, the consent decree has worked fairly
effectively. The primary goal of antitrust policy is the maintenance of
a competitive economy. The consent decree provides an instrument
for prompt action against those who would eliminate competition
and close the channels of commerce. Improvements are possible and
highly desirable. Yet, there is probably no other legal device which
has been more successful in accomplishing the purpose of antitrust
policy.
=The exception, of course, is in a simple conspiracy situation, where defendants
are usually readily willing to accept consent decrees to escape possible treble damage
suits.
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